

For Your Information

October 13, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

H. R. Rocard

S 12395

of income, and increases the revenue to be gained by the bill by \$200 million in 1970.

Deduction for Gasoline Tax.—The Committee decided not to approve an administration suggestion that the Federal income tax deduction be disallowed in the case of State and local gasoline taxes. Before the Committee acted, the Treasury Department modified its original suggestion so that those who commute not more than 10 miles per day could continue to deduct the State and local tax paid on the gasoline they purchase to travel to and from work. As already reported, the Committee rejected this suggestion.

Capital Gains Holding Period.—The Committee agreed that it would retain the provision in present law which requires taxpayers to hold a capital asset for 6 months if the gain from the sale of the asset is to qualify for favorable capital gains tax treatment. In taking this action, which was recommended by the Treasury Department, the Committee rejected the feature which would have extended the holding period to one year. The Committee did not act on the provision to repeal the maximum capital gains rate of 25 percent.

The Treasury Department indicated that there was some question as to whether the extension of the holding period would increase revenues by the \$150 million they had previously estimated. They indicated that on reconsideration they felt the revenue increase estimated under the House bill might not be nearly so large.

Deferred Compensation.—The Committee agreed to delete the provision of the House bill (Sec. 331) which would have imposed a tax on amounts received as deferred compensation based on the rates which would have been applied if the deferred amount had been received in the year in which earned. This action carried out a recommendation made by the Treasury Department.

Investment Tax Credit.—The Committee agreed that the rules in the House bill for repealing the 7 percent investment tax credit would be modified to conform to the Committee's previously announced decisions (of September 19, 1969) with respect to the repeal of the credit. In addition, the Committee made no change in its September 19 decisions.

This single change related to the special transitional exception for railroad rolling stock. Under the prior announcement this exception was to apply to all "rolling stock." Under the Committee's decision of today, this exception is not to apply to locomotives, flat cars, or railroad cars for the hauling of automobiles.

OPERATION INTERCEPT

Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, there is no doubt that the objectives of the administration's program "Operation Intercept" to diminish and prevent the flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs from Mexico to the United States is worthwhile.

I am aware of the fact that a Presidential task force strongly urged the United States to undertake a major law enforcement effort along the United States-Mexico border. I am told scores of border crossing points have been established where small independent groups of smugglers transport drugs into the United States by airplane, helicopter, automobile, and boats. The demand for drugs is rapidly increasing inside the United States, and of course unfortunately, smuggling is increasing, also. Everything one reads these days indi-

cates the seriousness of the narcotics and dangerous drug problem in the United States, especially among our youth.

According to a Department of Justice spokesman, Mexico officials agreed to cooperate in implementing Operation Intercept. However, the tremendous negative effect this operation has had on the overall economy along our borders seems to indicate that despite the justification for such an enforcement plan the United States neglected to accurately assess the impact on tourism, commerce, and our overall United States-Mexico relations. Furthermore, it seems the administration failed to accurately assess the amount of money and manpower required for such a large scale enforcement program.

The United States should provide the necessary personnel and funds, and the needed up-to-date equipment and facilities to improve the inspection program and allow for a free flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic. The people living along the border areas have been upset, and justifiably so, by the effect this law enforcement activity has had on industry, commerce, and tourism. In addition the residents have suffered many personal inconveniences, such as long traffic delays and repeated customs inspections.

The U.S. Government should immediately take whatever action is necessary to reduce the inconvenience to law abiding citizens in the area with appropriate assurances and action. Equally important, the United States should act to relieve any strain in our relations that developed with Mexico as a result of this enforcement plan.

The joint communique issued by the United States and Mexico Governments is a step in the right direction. Operation Cooperation as it is now called, and the revisions promised in the operation, hopefully will help to renew our close working relationships with the Mexican people. The communique states that the Mexican Government plans to step up their enforcement activities along the border. I am very much pleased by this development and look forward to the results of the late October talks, which should eliminate whatever communications and policy gap remains between the two nations.

STATEMENT BY RAND CORP. STAFF MEMBERS FAVORING TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. ROOPS FROM VIETNAM WITHIN 1 YEAR

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, six staff members of the Rand Corp., all of whom have done research on Vietnam for the Federal Government, have urged that the United States completely withdraw its forces from Vietnam within 1 year.

Their proposal—for complete disengagement within 1 year—is one with which I am in total agreement.

On September 25, I introduced the Vietnam Disengagement Act (S. 3000) that would require such complete withdrawal within 1 year.

The Rand Corp. is one of the oldest and most respected research institutions organized to study problems of national security. The Rand staff members who have made this proposal have made extensive studies for the Pentagon on the war in Vietnam, on subjects ranging from the effectiveness of bombing North Vietnam to interrogation of enemy prisoners.

It is extremely significant that men with such expertise—men who normally shun publicity—have urged this withdrawal timetable. It is another piece of evidence that swift disengagement from Vietnam is the only policy that makes sense.

The Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) has already placed in the RECORD, on October 9, a New York Times article on this proposal.

On Sunday, October 12, the Washington Post published a letter written by these six Rand staff members, setting forth the reasons for their withdrawal plan. It is one of the most cogent pieces of reasoning I have read on why it is essential that the United States disengage its troops from this terrible war within the next year.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this letter be printed in the RECORD. I also ask unanimous consent that an article written by Joseph Kraft on this proposal, which was also published in Sunday's Washington Post, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter and the article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A CASE AGAINST STAYING IN VIETNAM

To the Editor, the Washington Post:

Now that the American people are once again debating the issue of Vietnam, we desire to contribute to that discussion by presenting our own views, which reflect both personal judgments and years of professional research on the Vietnam war and related matters. We are expressing here our views as individuals, not speaking for the RAND Corporation, of which we are staff members; there is a considerable diversity of opinion on this subject, as on other issues, among our Rand colleagues.

We believe that the United States should decide now to end its participation in the Vietnam war, completing the total withdrawal of our forces within one year at the most. Such U.S. disengagement should not be conditioned upon agreement or performance by Hanoi or Saigon—i.e., it should not be subject to veto by either side.

It is our view that, apart from persuasive moral arguments that could lead to the same conclusion, there are four objections to continued U.S. efforts in the war:

1. Short of destroying the entire country and its people, we cannot eliminate the enemy forces in Vietnam by military means; in fact "military victory" is no longer the U.S. objective. What should now also be recognized is that the opposing leadership cannot be coerced by the present or by any other available U.S. strategy into making the kinds of concessions currently demanded.

2. Past U.S. promises to the Vietnamese people are not served by prolonging out inconclusive and highly destructive military activity in Vietnam. This activity must not be prolonged merely on demand of the Saigon government, whose capacity to survive on its own must finally be tested, regardless of the outcome.

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3. The importance of the U.S. national interest of the future political complexion of South Vietnam has been greatly exaggerated, as has the negative international impact of a unilateral U.S. military withdrawal.

4. Above all, the human, political, and material costs of continuing our part in the war far outweigh any prospective benefits, and are greater than the foreseeable costs and risks of disengagement.

The opponent's morale, leadership, and performance all evidence his continuing resiliency, determination, and effectiveness, even under extremely adverse conditions (in no small part because of his conviction that he fights for a just and vital cause). Estimates that the opponent's will or capacity (in North or South Vietnam) is critically weakening because of internal strains and military pressures are, in our view, erroneous. Even if a new strategy should produce military successes in Vietnam, substantially reduce U.S. costs, and dampen domestic opposition, Hanoi could not be induced to make any concessions (e.g., cease-fire or mutual withdrawals), so long as they implied recognition of the authority of the Saigon government. Thus, to make the end of U.S. involvement contingent upon such concessions is to perpetuate our presence indefinitely.

Our participation in the war will also be unjustifiably prolonged if we tie total withdrawals to basic changes in the policies and character of the South Vietnamese government. The primary interest of the present Saigon leadership is to perpetuate its status and power, and that interest is served not by seeking an end to hostilities through negotiations but only by continuing the war with U.S. support. Their interest is thus directly opposed to ours. For the same reason, the present Saigon government is not likely to seek the long-awaited improvements and "broadening" of its base. The United States should not obstruct favorable political change in Saigon by unconditional support of the present regime. Yet, we believe, the United States should in no way compromise or postpone the goal of total withdrawal by active American involvement in Vietnamese politics. Such interventions in the past have only increased our sense of responsibility for an outcome we cannot control.

Our withdrawal might itself produce the kinds of desirable political changes in Saigon that the U.S. presence seems to have inhibited, including the emergence of a cohesive nationalist consensus; and it might give better focus to our alliance relationships elsewhere in the world by bringing our Vietnam policy into line with the President's declaration in Guam on the limits of our partnerships.

As for global U.S. interests, the original rationale for a large scale U.S. military effort in Vietnam—the prevention of proxy victories by the USSR or Communist China—has long since been discredited. Moreover, we regard the Vietnamese insurgency as having special characteristics that cannot be considered typical of or exerting decisive influence on other revolutionary movements in Asia or elsewhere. We do not predict that only good consequences will follow for Southeast Asia or South Vietnam (or even the United States) from our withdrawal. What we do say is that the risks will not be less after another year or more of American involvement, and the human costs will surely be greater.

DANIEL ELLSBURG.
MELVIN GURTOV.
OLEG HOEFFDING.
ARNOLD L. HORELICK.
KONRAD KELLEN.
PAUL F. LANGER.

SANTA MONICA, CALIF.

BREACHING THE CODE—RAND ANALYSTS' PROTEST ON VIETNAM RAISES BASIC QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

(By Joseph Kraft)

SANTA MONICA, CALIF.—When six analysts from the Rand Corp. drop their slide rules and open their mouths to protest about Vietnam, something important has happened.

For the Rand protest, expressed in letters to the editors of *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, goes beyond the issue of Vietnam to the central moral problem of American public life. It raises the question of the responsibility borne by officials and analysts for the actions and policies of the governments they serve.

Rand, which has its headquarters in Santa Monica, is one of the oldest and most professional of the research institutions set up by the government after World War II to analyze problems of national security. It derives about 75 per cent of its annual budget from the Department of Defense. It does extensive work with classified material. It has recently begun to do a series of special studies for Henry Kissinger and the National Security Council. Its existence depends on having funds from, and good relations with, the federal government.

In the past, Rand analysis have repeatedly questioned prevailing government policies behind closed doors. Individual Rand staff members have participated in public discussions. But the six men involved in the present letter—Daniel Ellsberg, Melvin Gurtov, Oleg Hoeffding, Arnold Horelick, Konrad Kellen and Paul F. Langer—go way beyond the tradition. For they speak out as a group in direct opposition to a government policy which they had not before challenged. They published their letter over strong opposition from some of Rand's chief executives. And they did so at some risk to their future careers.

The basic argument on Vietnam unfolds in three stages. The first point is that Washington has committed itself to a Saigon regime that does not want peace. As the letter says: "The primary interest of the present Saigon leadership is to perpetuate its status and power, and that interest is not served by seeking an end to hostilities through negotiations but only by continuing the war with U.S. support."

The second point is that the other side cannot be made to negotiate on Saigon's terms. The letter says: "Even if a new strategy should produce military successes in Vietnam, substantially reduce U.S. costs and dampen domestic opposition, Hanoi could not be induced to make any concessions—so long as they implied recognition of the authority of the Saigon government."

The argument concludes with the proposition that, since the United States cannot bring either Hanoi or Saigon to negotiate, this country's best option is to walk away from the war. The letter says: "We believe that the United States should decide now to end its participation in the Vietnam war, completing that total withdrawal of our forces within one year at the most."

There is nothing shocking in these views. They are shared by many high officials in this and previous administrations. What is remarkable is that only a handful of those who have come to believe these ideas have said so in public.

Most have suppressed their true beliefs. They have preferred to play inside politics. They have subscribed to the basic Washington mystique that fidelity to a President transcends fidelity to convictions on even the most critical issues. They have followed the code of the apparatchik.

The Rand letter is chiefly important as a repudiation of the apparatchik code. The public protest breaches the bureaucratic tradition of mute service even when policy con-

flicts with conscience. And that crack in the old mystique requires a rethinking in two areas.

For one thing, the federal government is going to have to develop a more open policy in its relations with outside sources of expertise. The days are gone when good men, with an implicit faith that the United States was on the right side of the Cold War, signed up to do unquestioning research for the national security establishment. If the government wants to have the advice of good men, it is going to have to accept a wide range of questions about basic policy objectives. There is going to have to develop between Washington and the analysts much more of a give-and-take relation.

Conversely, a new obligation is imposed upon those disposed in the past to damn anybody with close ties to the government. Out of that shallow practice there have come sweeping attacks on many institutions doing work for government. But the fact now made manifest in the Rand protest is that these institutions are not uncritical mouthers of a monolithic line. They are not Dr. Strangelove's writ large. And thus, more than ever, there is an obligation on those of us with doubts about the government policy not to suspend our disbelief but to be careful, selective and discriminating in criticism.

REGIONAL AIR SERVICE PROJECTED IN ANALYSIS BY EDWIN L. COLODNY, VICE PRESIDENT OF ALLEGHENY AIRLINES

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, for many, many years I have endeavored to promote the value and importance of local service air carriers in the development of our national transportation networks. The regional carriers perform a vital function in bringing commercial air service to smaller communities throughout the United States. It is my firm belief that they will exercise an increasingly vital role in the future. The citizens of West Virginia are deeply interested in and concerned with the progress and advancement of local service carriers. We are served by Allegheny Airlines and Piedmont Airlines. The interstate and intrastate operations of these carriers are important to the traveling public and shippers of our Mountain State.

Edwin I. Colodny, executive vice president of legal affairs and marketing services for Allegheny Airlines, presented a thought-provoking paper at the International Symposium on Air Transportation in Nashville, Tenn., on August 21. His analysis, "Regional Service in the 1970's," outlines the service of local carriers to the traveling public and projects future developments in the next decade. Mr. Colodny cogently analyzes many of the complex problems to be faced and resolved if regional carriers are to continue their growth and to meet increased travel demands for smaller communities and lower density market areas.

I feel that his comments should be brought to the attention of Members of Congress who will be involved in the development policies and programs under which local service carriers operate.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the paper entitled "Regional Service in the 1970's" be printed in the RECORD.

October 13, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

H. Rowland

S 12377

AUGUST 20, 1969.

Hon. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN,
Chairman, the President's Commission for
the Observance of Human Rights Year
1968, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to submit the report of the Special Committee of Lawyers on the treaty-making power of the United States in Human Rights Matters.

As you noted in your letter transmitting the final report of the Commission to President Nixon:

"The whole of government must recognize its commitment to human rights and thereby seek to articulate its policies and programs in human rights terms. A touchstone of our commitment will be the ratification of additional human rights conventions through action by the Administration and the Senate."

The United States, in successive Administrations of both political parties, has taken the lead in working for a world in which human rights are the birthright of all. Nevertheless we have ratified only two of the more than a score of human rights conventions. Distinguished members of the legal profession have raised thoughtful questions relating to the constitutional competence of the United States to bind itself internationally on human rights, and the Special Committee of Lawyers has addressed itself to this question.

Our formal conclusions may be found at the beginning of our report. I would like to reiterate here, however, our finding, after a thorough review of judicial, Congressional and diplomatic precedents, that human rights are matters of international concern; and that the President, with the United States Senate concurring, may, on behalf of the United States, under the treaty power of the Constitution, ratify or adhere to any international human rights convention that does not contravene a specific Constitutional prohibition. The Special Committee of Lawyers would further commend the examination of proposed human rights conventions to their colleagues in the legal profession as a matter of high priority.

Respectfully yours,

TOM C. CLARK,
Chairman, Special Committee of Lawyers.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Hon. Tom C. Clark, Chairman, Associate Justice (Retired), U.S. Supreme Court.

Morris B. Abram, President, Brandeis University.

Terence H. Benbow, Attorney at Law, New York City.

Bruno V. Bitker, Attorney at Law, Milwaukee.

John H. Carey, Attorney at Law, New York City.

Dean Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Howard University Law School.

Professor Richard N. Gardner, Columbia University Law School.

William T. Gossett, Attorney at Law, Detroit.

Hon. Sarah T. Hughes, U.S. District Court.
William P. Rogers,¹ Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.

Frederick M. Rowe, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.²

Bernard G. Segal, Attorney at Law, Philadelphia.

Whitney North Seymour, Attorney at Law, New York City.

John R. Stevenson,² Attorney at Law, New York City.

¹ Secretary of State William P. Rogers terminated his active participation in the work of the Committee after he was designated Secretary of State by President-elect Nixon, December 12, 1968.

² Mr. Stevenson assumed his duties as Legal Adviser to the Department of State on July 14, 1969.

Hon. John Minor Wisdom, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I hope the series of speeches that I have given now for 2 years will begin to bear fruit and that the Committee on Foreign Relations will report these human rights conventions to the Senate, and that the Senate will act. It has been the only obstacle standing in the way of their ratification. The President has supported them. It is only the Senate that has stood in the way of their ratification.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for not to exceed 12 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, the Senator from Utah is recognized for not to exceed 12 minutes.

THE ONLY WAY OUT OF VIETNAM

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I have concluded that the present combination of peace talks in Paris, Vietnamization of the battlefield, and cautious U.S. troop withdrawals is not working.

It is not working because the North Vietnamese and Vietcong will never accept a cease-fire or free elections as long as the present Saigon government remains in power.

It is not working because the Government of South Vietnam is corrupt and repressive, and, unless it broadens its base, it will never gain the support of its people.

It is not working because the Government of South Vietnam will refuse to broaden its base as long as our troops are protecting it.

It is not working because Vietnamization really means trying to achieve a military solution by proxy.

It is not working because at this rate it will be years and maybe never before South Vietnam can completely take over the fighting.

It is not working because no matter how "unified" our country becomes, the Communists can outlast us in a waiting game and they know it.

But most important, it is not working because a year from now an end to the war still will not be visible. A year with more GI casualties and still no end.

I recommend, therefore, that the United States must cease all offensive military action in Vietnam at once and proceed to withdraw all combat forces as swiftly as can be done without endangering American lives. Our combat forces should fire only in self-defense.

The Government of South Vietnam should be notified that we will continue to aid it with materiel and civilian advice and skills, but that we will no longer participate in any offensive military action. If the Government of South Vietnam does not have broad enough civilian support or military strength to govern, then it must give way. We will protect American lives, but no longer will we seek to kill Vietnamese.

This conviction on my part has come only after the agony of long soulsearching and conscience wrestling. I now be-

lieve this is the only way to end the bloodshed of American boys in Vietnam. We have tried other courses without success. Now we must acknowledge our inability to control the battle, to prop up governments, and to dictate the course of events in Southeast Asia. We have not been defeated. We, of course, could stay in Vietnam forever. We could never be driven out. But it would be futile. As a great nation we must face reality.

It is my belief that we became involved in Vietnam for the highest of motives. Our thinking was conditioned largely by events in Korea, where we intervened to halt aggression by a militant neighbor. Painful and costly as it was, we succeeded in Korea and today South Korea prospers and is free. But in Vietnam we tried to stem invasion without success, and we found antigovernment forces everywhere throughout the countryside. And no government has emerged in South Vietnam to command allegiance as did Syngman Rhee in South Korea. The domestic rebellion against the government of South Vietnam has intermingled with invasion from the North to produce a wholly unstable and unmanageable condition in South Vietnam. We have tried to help stabilize this unhappy country and have poured in our blood and treasure without stint. Today we are no closer to our goal of a peaceful and free South Vietnam than we were in 1965. At this point we must be honest with ourselves and with the South Vietnamese. We must halt our participation in the war. South Vietnam must chart its own course, without our troops. We should continue to assist economically and should indicate our willingness to assist in the relocation of persons whose lives might be endangered after our troops have left.

In the beginning, I, like the great majority of Americans, felt that our action in aiding South Vietnam with military advisers, and later with combat troops, was right and would succeed. The optimistic reports of the military through 1965 and 1966 kept this feeling alive.

By 1967 my doubts had set in and in January of 1968 I visited South Vietnam where I was caught in the Tet offensive. Under that severe combat situation, I tended to feel primarily the urgency of staying alive, and I returned still unwilling to abandon our military effort. Throughout 1968 and 1969, I have continued to seek information and informed opinion as my apprehension mounted and my conviction solidified. I applauded President Nixon's announced withdrawal of troops and felt concern only when he qualified his action to a small fraction of our combat forces and reiterated U.S. policy to force the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese to a negotiated settlement. It is my judgment that never will we get a satisfactory settlement—or even any settlement. The Vietcong will never agree. President Nixon should know this. Our only course is to withdraw under conditions of maximum safety for our military personnel. Every day's delay now brings more casualties and mounting dissent. We must disengage at once.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. MOSS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

October 13, 1969

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I want to take just a moment to commend the Senator from Utah for what I believe to be a most honest, frank, and unequivocal statement of the dilemma that now faces us in Vietnam and the only practical course that is now left to us, which is to disengage from that conflict.

The Senator has very properly pointed out that we have been allied for many years with a political regime in South Vietnam that refuses to take the steps that would give it the confidence and support of its own people. This is not to say anything derogatory about the bravery or the sacrifice of those troops that have fallen in battle, either among the South Vietnamese forces or among our own young men who have fought over there under terribly difficult circumstances for a long period of time. But it is to say that the central lesson of our experience in Vietnam is that we cannot save a political regime abroad that does not have the respect of its own people; that is so corrupt and so oppressive that it is unable to inspire its own people to fight for it.

I do not know how we explain to the parents of young Americans who have fallen over there, supposedly in defense of freedom, that the present regime in Saigon has stayed in power by jailing its critics, non-Communists and Communists alike. There are an estimated 20,000 political prisoners held in the jails of Saigon, including the runnerup contender for the presidency in the election held in South Vietnam.

He said what the Senator from Utah is saying today. He is in jail for 5 years because of it. American troops are still there, being asked to sacrifice their lives and to accept that kind of regime. It will not work. There is no evidence that 1 year, 2 years, or 5 years from now we will be in any better position than we are today.

The Senator from Utah is correct in saying that the withdrawal process is not painless. It is not a sure thing. It is not risk free. Neither is there any evidence that we will be one bit better off many months, many casualties and many deaths from now.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, with the permission of the Senator from Utah, to have printed at the end of my remarks a statement published in yesterday's Washington Post. The article bears the signatures of six experts of the Rand Corp. As the Senator from Utah knows, this is a group that the Pentagon relies on heavily for military judgment. These six men have come to the conclusion, as the Senator from Utah is aware, that there is no other practical course ahead of us now than to remove our troops. They draw attention, as he has done, to the conflict of interest that exists between the government in Saigon and our own national interest.

I shall read a couple of sentences:

The primary interest of the present Saigon leadership is to perpetuate its status and power, and that interest is served not by seeking an end to hostilities through negotiations but only by continuing the war with U.S. support. Their interest—

Meaning the interests of Saigon—Is thus directly opposed to ours.

I shall read the final paragraph:

We do not predict that only good consequences will follow for Southeast Asia or South Vietnam (or even the United States) from our withdrawal. What we do say is that the risks will not be less after another year or more of American involvement, and the human costs will surely be greater.

So I congratulate the Senator from Utah for his realism, his honesty, and his dealing so squarely with the position that Americans are going to be underscoring on Wednesday of this week, namely, that the time has come for us to take this terrible burden off our backs and put our own national interests first, the interests of the people of this country first, and to free ourselves from a political regime in Saigon whose interests are increasingly divergent from our own.

Mr. MOSS. I thank the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from which the Senator from South Dakota has read be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 12, 1969]

A CASE AGAINST STAYING IN VIETNAM

Now that the American people are once again debating the issue of Vietnam, we desire to contribute to that discussion by presenting our own views, which reflect both personal judgments and years of professional research on the Vietnam war related matters. We are expressing here our views as individuals, not speaking for the Rand Corporation, of which we are staff members; there is a considerable diversity of opinion on this subject, as on other issues, among our Rand colleagues.

We believe that the United States should decide now to end its participation in the Vietnam war, completing the total withdrawal of our forces within one year at the most. Such U.S. disengagement should not be conditioned upon agreement or performance by Hanoi or Saigon—i.e., it should not be subject to veto by either side.

It is our view that, apart from persuasive moral arguments that could lead to the same conclusion, there are four objections to continued U.S. efforts in the war:

1. Short of destroying the entire country and its people, we cannot eliminate the enemy forces in Vietnam by military means; in fact "military victory" is no longer the U.S. objective. What should now also be recognized is that the opposing leadership cannot be coerced by the present or by any other available U.S. strategy into making the kinds of concessions currently demanded.

2. Past U.S. promises to the Vietnamese people are not served by prolonging our inconclusive and highly destructive military activity in Vietnam. This activity must not be prolonged merely on demand of the Saigon government, who capacity to survive on its own must finally be tested, regardless of the outcome.

3. The importance to the U.S. national interest of the future political complexion of South Vietnam has been greatly exaggerated, as has the negative international impact of a unilateral U.S. military withdrawal.

4. Above all, the human, political, and material costs of continuing our part in the war far outweigh any prospective

benefits, and are greater than the foreseeable costs and risks of disengagement.

The opponent's morale, leadership, and performance all evidence his continuing resiliency, determination, and effectiveness, even under extremely adverse conditions (in no small part because of his conviction that he fights for a just and vital cause). Estimates that the opponent's will or capacity (in North or South Vietnam) is critically weakening because of internal strains and military pressures are, in our view, erroneous. Even if a new strategy should produce military successes in Vietnam, substantially reduce U.S. costs, and dampen domestic opposition, Hanoi could not be induced to make any concessions (e.g., cease-fire or mutual withdrawals, so long as they implied recognition of the authority of the Saigon government). Thus, to make the end of U.S. involvement contingent upon such concessions is to perpetuate our presence indefinitely.

Our participation in the war will also be unjustifiably prolonged if we tie total withdrawals to basic changes in the policies and character of the South Vietnamese government. The primary interest of the present Saigon leadership is to perpetuate its status and power, and that interest is served not by seeking an end to hostilities through negotiations but only by continuing the war with U.S. support. Their interest is thus directly opposed to ours. For the same reason, the present Saigon government is not likely to seek the long-awaited improvements and "broadening" of its base. The United States should not obstruct favorable political change in Saigon by unconditional support of the present regime. Yet, we believe, the United States should in no way compromise or postpone the goal of total withdrawal by active American involvement in Vietnamese politics. Such interventions in the past have only increased our sense of responsibility for an outcome we cannot control.

Our withdrawal might itself produce the kinds of desirable political changes in Saigon that the U.S. presence seems to have inhibited, including the emergence of a cohesive nationalist consensus; and it might give better focus to our alliance relationships elsewhere in the world by bringing our Vietnam policy into line with the President's declaration in Guam on the limits of our partnerships.

As for global U.S. interests, the original rationale for a large scale U.S. military effort in Vietnam—the prevention of proxy victories by the USSR or Communist China—has long since been discredited. Moreover, we regard the Vietnamese insurgency as having special characteristics that cannot be considered typical of or exerting decisive influence on other revolutionary movements in Asia or elsewhere. We do not predict that only good consequences will follow for Southeast Asia or South Vietnam (or even the United States) from our withdrawal. What we do say is that the risks will not be less after another year or more of American involvement, and the human costs will surely be greater.

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SANTA MONICA, CALIF.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from South Dakota for his observations. He has long been a leader in the endeavor to have the United States disengage itself from Vietnam. I have followed carefully his speeches on the subject. In part, they are what has brought me to my final conclusion.

Mr. President, several Senators have asked me to yield to them, so I ask unanimous consent that we may continue for 10 minutes more.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Texas.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Utah for his statement and the position he has taken. I agree with him. I have not had to change my views, because I have never made a speech in support of our policy in Vietnam in all the years that it has been followed. I have thought it was wrong from the beginning. I think it is wrong now.

We helped to pressure the British out of India. We helped to pressure the Netherlands out of Indonesia. But when it came to Vietnam, we reversed our policy. We have been utterly inconsistent. We pressured the French to stay in Vietnam, and we continued to fight even after their defeat at Dienbienphu. Then we gradually interjected our forces into Vietnam under the guise of sending advisers to the military forces of South Vietnam.

Why we should have attempted to retain a colonial power in South Vietnam when we had helped to get the Dutch out of Indonesia and the British out of India is a mystery to me; it simply does not make sense. Furthermore, it is utterly incompatible with our policy in other areas of Asia.

We have apparently attempted to take the place of the French in South Vietnam. Of course, we did not state this as our purpose, but that is what has happened. The people of Vietnam historically have fought long and desperately against foreign powers. They fought the Japanese and the French. Many military leaders have stated that they did not see how the Vietnamese could fight these wars. They have had to use women and children to fight them. This shows their desire to be relieved of a foreign invader. I think that should have some impact on our conscience as a people when we continue a war after women and children have fought and died to prevent a foreign power from occupying their country.

I think the statement of the Senator from Utah is correct. I agree with the position he has taken. I commend him for the long and careful study that brought him to this conclusion. It has strengthened my own opinions of this matter. I think his statement will be of great benefit to all the American people.

Mr. MOSS. I thank the Senator from Texas for his comments.

I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. DOLE. I do not wish to quarrel with the Senator's conclusion. We all have a right to reach our own conclusions. The Senator suggests it has been difficult for him to reach this conclusion; that he has reached it only in the last few days or weeks.

I wonder what the Senator believes our position should be in Southeast Asia. Should we become a second-rate power?

Should we dismiss the 40,000 young men who have lost their lives in Vietnam?

I remind the Senator from Utah that that is not compatible with the history of our great country. I understand that George Washington had a few problems in the early days of this country. I understand that there were censorship and political prisoners in America as recently as World War II.

I think that many of us who make judgments about corruption in South Vietnam or other problems in South Vietnam may not have sufficient information. I certainly do not have the information to say on the Senate floor or anywhere else that the Government of South Vietnam is corrupt, that it does not represent the people. But I have spoken with persons who have been there and who indicate that there is a change in South Vietnam, that there is respect for the government, that reforms are taking place.

I would only say to the Senator from Utah that there is a difference in the war today compared with conditions a year ago. There is a new direction in the war compared with a year ago. There is a strategy for peace in Vietnam.

Maybe the withdrawal of 20 percent of our combat troops is insignificant to some persons, but I think it is significant. President Nixon has not escalated the war; he has done everything he could to deescalate the war.

I hope that by his statement the Senator from Utah did not intend to be critical of President Nixon's statement, because on page 3, the President indicates that he is having the same struggle that the Senator had in reaching a very difficult conclusion.

I would only say, on behalf of the President, that the demonstration on Wednesday is not needed for his benefit. He wants peace as earnestly as President Kennedy wanted peace and President Johnson wanted peace.

I hope that on Wednesday we might demonstrate against our enemy, the North Vietnamese, and see if we can get some response from the enemy.

I would hope that the Senator from Utah might join in sponsoring the resolution I introduced along with 34 other Senators this morning to call upon the North Vietnamese, the National Liberation Front, to make some affirmative response toward the settlement of this war without further conflict and bloodshed.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I appreciate the comment of the Senator from Kansas. Certainly, I wish I could feel there would be response from Hanoi to any resolution agreed upon by the Senate or issued by our Government.

But as I recall, we have been calling upon Hanoi to negotiate now for about 4 or 5 years. In fact, the whole thrust of the Paris peace talks is to obtain response from the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong who are also at the table. We have not been able to obtain any progress and I do not think we ever will.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, if the Senator from Utah were from North Vietnam and represented Hanoi at a time when 20 or 30 U.S. Senators were saying, "Do not

do anything. We will get out anyway," what response would be made?

Mr. MOSS. I do not know what response I would make. But as I said in my statement, I do not think the enemy will ever negotiate no matter how unified we are. They have been fighting for their objective for over 20 years. We can never outlast them in a waiting game.

I would also consider it from the point of view of the American troops who are there now and the American citizens at home. How long must they wait for a negotiated settlement?

The Senator from South Dakota asked what we would say to the 40,000 men who have already lost their lives. I say that we should feel humble and grateful to them. However, certainly we will not redeem the situation in any way by losing an additional 40,000 men. We cannot bring back these 40,000 lives tragically lost, but we can save the lives of those half million men still in Vietnam.

The Senator from Kansas asked me if I meant my statement to be critical of President Nixon.

I pointed out in my statement that I applaud the President for the steps he has taken to withdraw some of our combat personnel from Vietnam. But I want the rate of withdrawal greatly increased.

I would like to see an immediate cessation of all offensive operations and a concentration only on withdrawing our troops as rapidly as possible without endangering American lives.

It is the only reasonable course we can follow, as I tried to point out. I had hoped, along with most other citizens that we could succeed in our objectives to stabilize Vietnam. I had hoped that a broad-based position could be established in South Vietnam so that we could then withdraw.

But it has not worked. It is a colossal failure. We will lose more and more American lives and spend more and more American money the longer we stay there. And still we will be no closer to our objectives.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I share the view of the Senator from Utah—and every other American does—that we should end the fighting in Vietnam as quickly as we can.

I am afraid, however, that an impression of panic may have been created in America because of the many statements that have been made on the Senate floor. If I were an enemy in the Government of Hanoi and knew that someone here would rise and defend Hanoi and uphold the role of Hanoi in Vietnam, I would want to wait, thinking that sooner or later enough public opinion would be aroused that the United States would have to withdraw.

I know that the Senator feels as I do about the men who have lost their lives. I know something about war and about the tragedies of war. I point out on behalf of President Nixon that he does have a strategy for peace. In all fairness, we cannot expect him to end in 8 months what someone else could not end in 4 or 5 years.

The President wants peace as strongly as does the Senator from Utah, Presi-

dent Kennedy, President Johnson, or anyone else.

I recognize that no brownie points are to be gained from talking about slowing down the withdrawal. However, in the long run, talking about Southeast Asia and our role there, if we do as the Senator advocates and come home, how many more men will we lose in future years in some other conflict?

I do not know. Perhaps the Senator from Utah is right. However, speaking for those 40,000 who have lost their lives, we owe a great deal of gratitude to them.

Mr. MOSS. I thank the Senator. But I must disagree with the Senator. The American people have not panicked. In growing numbers they simply see the futility of our present course. And they are not too proud to change that course.

I do not think it is a partisan matter. I think it rises far above partisanship. I intend to support the President in achieving peace. It does no good to search for scapegoats. There is blame enough for all of us. What we need is a way out.

I have pointed out what I think we should do now to disengage. I hope the President will listen.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MOSS. I yield.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding to me.

I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Utah on his address and the position he has taken regarding our involvement in an ugly civil war in South Vietnam.

The question has been asked concerning what our role should be in Southeast Asia. The United States does not have a mandate from Almighty God to police the entire world. I speak with firsthand knowledge of Vietnam. I was in South Vietnam in October of 1965 for nearly a month. Last year I spent nearly a month in South Vietnam and in Laos. I have been in every area of South Vietnam.

I know that the Saigon militarist regime of Ky and Thieu is not representative of the people of South Vietnam. I know that we are involved in an ugly, undeclared, and immoral war in South Vietnam.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Utah have an additional 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, it is not only my judgment that we are involved in a civil war, but I can also voice statements made to me by our generals in South Vietnam and in Thailand when I was there, substantiating that fact.

General Westmoreland informed me that the bulk of the Vietcong fighting us were born and reared in South Vietnam. Gen. Richard Stilwell, then General Westmoreland's chief deputy, informed me that 80 percent of the Vietcongs fighting us in the Mekong Delta were born and reared in the Mekong Delta, which is south of Saigon. I told him,

"Well, we are involved in a civil war." He did not like that. He answered, "Well, it could be termed an insurrection."

The fact is that it is well known in South Vietnam that the militaristic rule of Saigon is not representative of the majority of the people in South Vietnam. It represents 20 percent of the people at most. I know the Senator from Utah is aware that both General Thieu and Air Marshal Ky were born and reared in North Vietnam.

There is no truth in the assertion that our enemy is North Vietnam. The head of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam is a Saigon lawyer. He is not a Communist.

The fact is that Americans have been sent there by ship and plane. American troops in South Vietnam should be returned home this year in the same manner in which they were sent there—by ship and plane.

Until all our forces can be returned home, we should very wisely follow the advice of Generals Gavin and Ridgway to the effect that we should withdraw our remaining forces there to our coastal enclaves where they would have the umbrella of our airpower and the protection of the 7th Fleet.

Many more than 46,000 Americans have already lost their lives in Vietnam. In addition, 8,000 Americans have been killed in South Vietnam from what the Pentagon terms as accidents and injuries. We never had that credibility gap, so-called, in World War II, as the Senator from Utah knows from his service.

Also, approximately 500,000 civilians—women, children, and old men—have been killed or maimed for life by our bombing and artillery fire. In hospitals in Vietnam I saw pitiful little children, burned and maimed.

I am one who will be very glad to demonstrate next Wednesday for peace. I will be glad to join in that demonstration against our involvement in the longest war ever waged by our Republic, the most unpopular war ever waged, an undeclared war at that, and the bloodiest foreign war, costing the most lives—priceless lives of American youngsters—in a little faraway country which is of no importance whatsoever to the defense of the United States.

I do not have any secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. However, a good plan, an excellent plan, would to bring our forces home just as soon as possible.

Here we are trying to maintain in power a corrupt regime, as the Senator has stated. It is well known that Vice President Ky has an unlisted account in Hong Kong and another one in Switzerland. We know from the public press that Madame Thieu, the wife of the President of the Saigon regime, recently bought an expensive villa in Switzerland.

Let us withdraw. Let us get out of this war the same way we got in—by ships and planes. The Saigon regime was originally put in power because they refused to permit neutralists and many Buddhists and others to vote. If the soldiers in the ARVN forces, the so-called friendly forces—I say too friendly to fight, when we examine the statistics

and see that week after week more Americans have been killed and wounded in combat there than these so-called friendly forces—cannot then maintain the Saigon government, we had better leave at least one plane to take Ky and Thieu out of the country to rendezvous with their bank accounts and to join Madame Thieu in her lavish villa. But we should get out, just as the Senator has said.

I again compliment the Senator from Utah upon the fine statement he has made today.

Mr. MOSS. I thank the Senator.

I yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold for a brief moment? VISIT TO THE SENATE BY THE MINISTER OF FINANCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

I do not want to interrupt the dialog which is taking place, but we have a distinguished visitor from the Federal Republic of Germany, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Strauss, who is in the Chamber, and he is on an extremely tight schedule. If it is convenient, I wonder whether the distinguished Senator from Utah would be kind enough to indulge a short recess, without losing his right to the floor when the Senate reconvenes. It would be appreciated by the leadership. It is only intended to have a 4-minute recess, which would provide an opportunity for the Members of the Senate to extend greetings to this very distinguished visitor to our country.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator from Utah had yielded to me. May I just finish? I know Franz Joseph Strauss, and I am delighted to welcome him.

Mr. MOSS. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I shall address myself to this subject tomorrow, with Senator PELL.

Is it not a fact that what Senator DOLE has done today—and with the very impressive list of cosponsors—is to pose the issue: Either you are going to pursue a strategy of trying to eucbre, pressure, influence the North Vietnamese to make peace in Paris, or you are going to pursue a unilateral strategy, wherever it may hit, whatever it may hit, whomever it may influence; but you are going to turn the combat responsibility over to the South Vietnamese in a reasonable time, ready or not; and this is the real issue before the Senate of the United States.

Mr. MOSS. As I understand it, the Senator from Kansas' resolution in another plea to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong to negotiate. But my response to Senator DOLE was that we have been pleading, pressing, and pushing for years. Every avenue I know of has been tried to get this kind of negotiation. We have tried bombing them to the negotiating table. That did not work. Now we are trying negotiation. But I think that is an absolute stalemate. The enemy will never negotiate and I do not think we can force him to no matter what resolutions we pass, no matter how we wait. Therefore, I suggest my action—a unilateral strategy as the Senator from New York puts it.

October 13, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 12381

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess for 4 minutes in order that Senators may greet our distinguished visitor, and that I be granted the floor when the Senate reconvenes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. INOUYE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS

Thereupon, (at 2 o'clock and 6 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until 2:10 p.m.

[Applause, Senators rising.]

During the recess, Minister of Finance Franz Josef Strauss was greeted by Members of the Senate.

On the expiration of the recess, the Senate reassembled and was called to order by the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE).

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. INOUYE in the chair). The Chair recognizes the Senator from Utah.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one-half minute?

Mr. MOSS. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, yesterday, Sunday, October 12, 1969, Dr. Strauss, the distinguished Minister of Finance of the Federal Republic of Germany, delivered the dedication address in Columbia, S.C., at a new coliseum at the University of South Carolina. On that occasion he made a deep and lasting impression on the people of my State.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the address by Dr. Strauss be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND EUROPE

(By the Chairman of the Christian Social Union and Federal Minister of Finance, Dr. H. C. Franz Josef Strauss)

For many years, we have witnessed promising beginnings of a partnership between the United States and Europe in a number of fields: economic, scientific, technological and political. But unfortunately, although we should have known better, we have not been able to establish a genuine and full partnership between the United States and Europe. The reason is that such a partnership requires more than mere cooperation in settling and overcoming mutual difficulties. The idea of an "Atlantic partnership" which once gave rise to high hopes of new forms of progress on both sides of the Atlantic has disappeared in the welter of day-to-day political routine. This is all the more deplorable as such a wider partnership between America and Europe—which would turn the North Atlantic Ocean into an inland sea—would enable us to tackle effectively the great problems of our century. But such a "transatlantic community" presupposes the existence of partners and Europe today is not a partner.

For a time, the world was fascinated by the European experiment. The rapid emergence of the Common Market seemed to raise the curtain on an early sweeping integration of Western Europe which would then be able to speak with one voice. In the meantime, however, it has become evident that a dialogue between the United States and Europe has remained an illusion, even where fields are concerned which have become Community matters under the Treaty of Rome. Real-

ization of the United States of Europe has been bogged down in a community narrowly confined to economic objectives and strictly limited to its original members. The conviction that close economic cooperation could not fail to lead to political integration has been demolished. The history of the United States itself shows that political union can overcome economic rivalries more easily than economic union can overcome conflicting political interests.

To enable a dialogue to begin between the United States and Europe the O.E.E.C. was established in 1948. Its task was to coordinate European reconstruction which was financed from Marshall Plan funds. O.E.E.C., however, was not a genuine European partner of the United States, because the relationship between you and us, between the United States and Europe, was in fact a rather one-sided relationship between donor and donee. But in a real partnership there must be give and take. And this presupposes partners of more or less equal size and strength—or at least the possibility of the two being complementary to each other. A giant and a dwarf generally make bad, or even ridiculous, partners, much as the well-known duet of Pat and Patachon.

O.E.E.C. was succeeded by O.E.C.D. and the latter, with its large number of committees and working parties and its broader membership including the United States, Canada and Japan in addition to the old O.E.E.C. members, has grown into a predominantly multilateral institution, drowning the transatlantic dialogue. Neither of these bodies could furnish the organizational basis for responsible American-European initiatives.

Similar considerations apply to other international institutions such as GATT, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the United Nations development assistance organizations where North America and Western Europe cooperate on a broader basis. Here, the emphasis is on the mutual coordination of national policies and—in certain conditions—on jointly agreed procedures in dealings with third parties.

In some sectors, cooperation on national and supernational levels is well-tried so that a partnership between Europe and the United States might evolve as European integration progresses.

1. TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Trade relations between two countries are reflected in their balances of payments. Up to 1967, the balance between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States was characterized by large German deficits.

1968 was the first year in which a German surplus was achieved owing to a very large increase in our exports. While the balance on current account between the United States and Germany was just about in equilibrium in 1967, it showed a German surplus of DM 3,500 million in 1968.

In recent years, the United States has been the largest supplier to Germany and the second largest buyer of German goods. In 1968, 13.5 percent of total German imports came from the United States and 10.7 percent of all German exports went to the United States.

The exchange of goods between Germany and the United States, in DM million, was in 1965 imports 9,195.9 exports 5,740.6 with a deficit of 3,445.3 was in 1966 imports 9,177.4 exports 7,177.7 with a deficit of 1,999.7 was in 1967 imports 8,555.6 exports 7,859.1 with a deficit of 696.5 was in 1968 imports 8,849.6 exports 10,833.3 with a surplus of 1,983.8.

The pattern of German external trade was temporarily influenced by the Law concerning Measures to Protect the Economy from Adverse Effects of External Trade and Payments (taxation of exports and a tax relief for imports). As a result, exports scheduled for

1969 were for a large part already effected in November and December 1968 so as to bypass taxation. In the first quarter of 1969, exports dropped considerably, but then a recovery set in and exports rose again substantially. As far as imports are concerned, they at first slowed down somewhat in the last quarter of 1968, but in the course of 1969 there was a marked increase in imports from the United States.

2. TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE

Trade between the United States and Western Europe is on the increase. Whereas the increase in United States exports to Europe has in the past years been absorbed by EEC and EFTA in equal proportions, the increase in United States imports has largely come from EEC countries which goes to show their greater economic efficiency.

The pattern of United States trade with Europe, in U.S. \$ million, was in 1966 imports 620.30 of which—from EEC, 341.51; from EFTA, 244.74; exports, 753.02. Of which to EEC, 438.70; to EFTA, 234.95.

In 1967 imports, 651.60. Of which from EEC, 370.04; from EFTA, 240.71. Exports, 816.11. Of which to EEC, 465.15; to EFTA, 264.51.

In 1968 imports, 819.10. Of which from EEC, 487.40; from EFTA, 283.97; exports, 884.17. Of which to EEC, 499.51; to EFTA, 297.84.

Both imports from, and exports to, Europe accounted for approximately 30 percent of total United States imports and exports.

3. NUCLEAR RESEARCH

In the field of reactor development, industrial cooperation has evolved in the form of a general exchange of know-how between Siemens and Westinghouse as well as between AEG and General Electric. In addition, Siemens has recently acquired North American Rockwell's one-third participation in INTERATOM; in exchange, North American Rockwell is said to have received a certain amount of Siemens shares.

There is a licence agreement between Gulf General Atomic and Gutehoffnungshutte under which the latter can utilize the results of Gulf's research work in building reactors in Germany.

Attempts are made to secure cooperation with the United States in developing an In-core Thermionic Reactor (for supplying spacecraft and launchers with power from a reactor). Germany may be in a position to develop a terrestrial prototype of such a reactor, but it cannot test it in space for lack of the necessary launchers.

4. SPACE RESEARCH

There are three agreements on bilateral cooperation in this field: (a) the research programme agreed upon with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on 17 July 1965 for developing and launching a satellite for measuring the energy spectrum and the flux of electrons and protons in the inner Van Allen belt (Satellite project Azur); (b) a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on developing and launching a satellite for probing phenomena in the upper atmosphere (ionosphere and exosphere), aeronomy satellite; (c) a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on developing and launching a solar probe for studying the solar plasma and interplanetary matter.

In all three cases, the United States makes available the necessary launching rockets.

The joint projects just mentioned also comprise an extensive NASA training programme for German engineers.

5. DATA PROCESSING AND MARINE RESEARCH

Germany is at present substantially extending its research activities in these fields

and some form of useful cooperation may be expected to evolve sooner or later.

6. ARMS INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY

The origins of cooperation between our two countries in this field date back to the German-American Agreement on the Purchase of Military Equipment by the Federal Republic of Germany in the United States under which the United States agreed to furnish the initial equipment of the newly established Federal German armed forces. In subsequent years, Germany has again and again effected large-scale arms purchases in the United States. These purchases play an important part in the offset arrangements between our two countries. The fact that German firms were charged with maintaining and repairing the arms supplied, and produced equipment under United States licences, has resulted in close cooperation between the arms industries of our two countries. A recent example is the licensed production of the Bell UH-1 D and CH 53 helicopters in Germany. Cooperation which may properly be called American-European has evolved in the case of larger weapon systems which require standardization on the basis of NATO criteria, e.g., the licensed production of the F 104 Starfighter and of the air-defence missile system Hawk as well as the installation of the NADGE system.

As not all German arms requirements could be satisfied by American supplies, a limited German arms industry had to be created. It has since designed and produced the "Leopard", a modern battle tank for which interest has been shown also abroad. The experience thus gained enables us to contribute on an equal footing to the joint American-German project of a Main Battle Tank (MBT or Kpz 70).

Necessarily, international partnership in arms production, as in other fields, demands that both sides should have something to offer. But as yet American-European, and particularly American-German, arms trade has been a "one-way" affair. While Germany purchased and still purchases many thousand millions dollars worth of arms in the United States, German arms exports to the United States have so far been more or less limited to a few 20 mm guns manufactured by Rheinmetall.

One of the reasons for this is that it is not Germany's ambition to build an arms industry which could compete with anything like yours. In the interest of offset, we shall continue to buy as many as possible of the arms we need in the United States. "As many as possible" means, of course, as far as the equipment offered meets our special requirements and as far as the price is within our means.

Moreover, it is only in a limited number of fields of arms technology that a small country like Germany can reach a level permitting it to cooperate with your great country as an equal partner. We have, for instance, been able to gain some experience in vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft technology which we are now contributing to a joint American-German V/STOL aircraft technology programme. In addition, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is interested in the technological concept embodied in the German V/STOL transporter Do 31, and is studying whether and to what extent V/STOL aircraft can be used for civilian feeder lines.

But real partnership with your country in the field of arms technology will not materialize until the small German arms industry has been integrated with that of other European countries so that yours will have one opposite number. Dealing with a bigger partner will certainly be more profitable for you. If the European arms industries—for the benefit of our Alliance—are to contribute to the technological superiority of the free west, they will have to start by establishing closer cooperation among themselves.

An important step in this direction is the agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy on the joint development and production of a Multirole Combat Aircraft (MRCA). It is regrettable that France did not find it possible to join. The MRCA programme opens up new possibilities for a genuine partnership between Europe and America in the field of arms technology. For an American contribution will be of great importance. In particular, I have in mind how far your industry is ahead in the field of electronics which is becoming increasingly important in modern high-performance aircraft.

But even a European arms industry will neither be in a position nor wish to compete with the arms industry of a world power like the United States. Rather, its role would be that of supplementing and strengthening the potential of the American arms industry in the interest of our western defensive alliance.

7. DIRECT GERMAN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Direct German investment in the United States is grossly inadequate as a basis of a useful and sound partnership between our two countries. In 1968, it accounted for 8 percent of the total volume of German investment abroad. The share of German investment in total direct foreign investment in the United States was 3.2 percent (or DM 318 million). This is a poor show compared with American investment in the Federal Republic of Germany which amounted to \$3,077 million in 1966 and to \$3,487 million in 1967.

Between 1 September 1961 and 30 June 1968, the United States invested DM 7,500 million in Germany. New investment by German business in the years 1964-1968 on the other hand, amounted to DM 844 million.

The reasons for this relative inactivity on the part of German business abroad are twofold:

(a) it is undercapitalized;

(b) it twice lost its capital invested abroad.

It is evident that German external trade and payments relations are based on an expanded exchange of goods rather than on capital transactions. The reverse is true in the case of other large industrialized nations. Admittedly in recent years, when the Federal Republic achieved large balance of trade surpluses, German external accounts were to a great extent balanced by capital exports, particularly in the form of portfolio investment. This way of balancing a country's external accounts by lendings may be justified in the case of a temporary imbalance, but in the case of structural trade surpluses capital exports in the form of direct private investment should have preference. In fact, it is closer financial interrelation between countries which is the basis of genuine partnership, that is, of a mutual exchange of technological and organizational information. Direct investment furthers the integration of national economies and favours the international division of labor; the resulting growth benefits all concerned. That is why the 1969 Tax Adjustment Law encouraged German investment abroad by fiscal measures. They might be supplemented by credit policy measures which are under discussion at present; the problem here is to avoid the devil of interventionist controls and the deep sea of massive subsidies.

8. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

It is indispensable for the preservation and defense of the freedom of the West that we Europeans should in future bear our fair share in the Alliance which is commensurate with our strength and our economic resources. The conviction that the security of the United States requires the continued existence of the Atlantic defensive alliance is still valid. If Western Europe were drawn into the Soviet orbit, that would be the beginning

of the end of a free United States. Yet, we Europeans have no right to expect our Americans friends and allies to be forever responsible for Europe's freedom and destiny. Rather, it is our duty to strengthen our continent ourselves in order to relieve the United States of some of its many tasks. This is possible only if NATO is transformed from a defensive alliance for United States protection of the free European nations into an American-European pact. And such a pact of two continents can only be brought about if first the west European partners of the United States get together to form a group within the Alliance with the aim of joint political action as the result of co-ordination and co-operation among themselves. The first task of such "grouping"—to give it a deliberately undramatic name—should be to take stock of the confused European situation.

(a) The Kremlin's strategy

The Kremlin's strategical plans remain clearly discernible, although some people are trying to revive their pipedreams and to cover reality again by a veil of error, delusion and cant. During the night which preceded August the twenty-first, nineteen hundred and sixty-eight the Soviets by occupying Czechoslovakia consolidated the "cordon stalinain" around their European sphere of influence, and thus unmistakably disproved the theory that in wise restraint of their way they might be disposed to transform their empire into a "commonwealth" of sovereign states. Their military action was buttressed by a political doctrine pronounced "ex cathedra" by Leonid Brezhnev. This doctrine lays down the law that the Soviet Union has the right to intervene in any socialist country of the communist camp wishing to shape life within its frontiers and contacts with others outside too much according to its own needs. At the same time, when it seems opportune and expedient to do so the Soviet Union seeks to intimidate by ruthless threats any "capitalist" state not bowing to this doctrine unquestioningly—a case in point was its announcement that it would invoke the so-called enemy clauses of the United Nations Charter against Bonn to bring it to heel. The Soviets want a divided Europe and ultimately a Europe under their control, and for this purpose they find it very useful to talk of German revanchisme and of a—fictitious—German threat.

(b) The main functions of the Atlantic Alliance

In this situation, and for quite some time to come, the Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. One is to maintain the military balance which so far has prevented aggression and black mail, and will continue to do so in the future. The other is to maintain the political unity of action among European countries and between Europe and the United States. If the Alliance should fail to fulfill these functions, the Soviets will sooner or later by subtle political manoeuvres find the weak spot which they can exploit to divide us and ultimately bring us under their control. In the foreseeable future, maintenance of the Alliance will remain the only effective response to the undiminished challenge from the East and thus the only guarantee of our common security. But the Alliance must be adjusted to changes and developments in the world. The only way to do this is by strengthening the European element of the Alliance. Europeans must cooperate more closely in the field of defence, and must step up their military effort, gradually integrating their armed forces. On this basis, a new shape of the Alliance will have to be worked out with the United States within the framework of NATO reform.

(c) European security conference and European peace system

To moot this subject in the supposed interest of Western security throws a glaring

light on the pipedreams and illusions of some Western—and particularly Western German—politicians. I regret that I have to include the outgoing Federal German Foreign Minister and many of his party friends. In my view, the old socialist dream of an All-European security system that could be built if all European nations left both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would mean the end of the Western world. It is therefore a hopeful sign that the scheme of a so-called European security conference and European peace system has been coldly received in the United States and France. To my mind there is every justification to fear that it would only put the seal on the status quo and the division of Germany. One must be grateful to Mr. Alastair Buchan, Head of the Imperial Defence College and formerly Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, for countering the idea of a European security conference advocated by the former Soviet Ambassador in London, Mr. Ivan M. Maisky, and refuting the claim that the forces of peace were stronger in Europe today than the forces of war, pointing to the following facts:

1. that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has increased the number of Soviet troops permanently stationed in Europe by 20 per cent;

2. that the military budget of the Soviet Union has been steadily increasing in the past four years whereas that of West-European countries has remained at the same level;

3. that military circles have obviously gained greater influence in the Kremlin than they had before.

Likewise, Mr. D.E.T. Luard, Labour M.P.: for Oxford, rightly emphasized that what the Soviet Union hoped to achieve at a European security conference was restoration of its damaged prestige, stabilization of its western front, enhancement of the status of the Soviet zone of Germany, recognition of the Oder-NeiBe line and disposition of the United States to withdraw its forces from Europe, whereas this conference was not likely to yield anything of any benefit to the West. As matters stand, we West-Europeans cannot but urgently appeal to our American friends to keep vigilant guard with us so that the dangers lurking behind this seducing facade may be recognized in time. If the Soviet Union were honestly interested in European security and in reinforcing world peace, it would have to be more explicit about, or at least to give some indication of, the steps which it would be prepared to take itself with a view to solving this problem. But before this has happened, any innocent acceptance of such Eastern proposals would mean playing with fire and might jeopardize the freedom of all of us.

(d) Common strategy for the defence of Europe

In the immediate future, the most important task is to work out a common strategy for the defence of Europe. Its principal objective must be the maintenance of peace.

What we need in future is not a military defence concept, but a political security concept in line with the progress of technology. Strategy and technology will have to concentrate on the one task which will count in future, that is, credible and effective deterrence. The credibility and effectiveness of deterrence will be exclusively determined by three inseparable elements of equal importance:

The chain of deterrence must have no gaps. Any gap closed by conventional means only will destroy the whole deterrent effect.

The deterrents must be adequate and at least equivalent to the potential of the enemy.

The use of the deterrents in case of aggression must be compulsory. Only then will deterrence be credible.

(e) Nuclear division of labour between Europe and the United States

A concept of European security which meets these requirements is conditional upon a "nuclear division of labour" and, at the same time, closer co-operation between the United States and its European allies. But such a more sophisticated strategy which would imply that United States power would not need to be brought to bear at the very first moment, cannot be applied unless Europe is able to protect itself. The larger countries of Western Europe have the human, financial and therefore economic resources to create their own joint and efficient defence. What is lacking is the determination to do so. There is no room in Europe today for a purely national defence policy; such a policy would be entirely out of the question where nuclear strategy is concerned, for this calls for planning space which just does not exist within the narrow confines of individual European countries. That is why in the long run we need a European defence organization. It is the only chance Western Europe has of becoming a potentially equal and autonomous military partner of the United States within NATO in the foreseeable future. The first step could be for Great Britain and France to pool their nuclear arms, creating the core of a European nuclear force to which the other European countries could make appropriate contributions. In this initial stage of the community, the order to use nuclear weapons could only be given by the existing authorities in whose territories parts of the nuclear arsenal were located. In this way, it would be possible very soon to get two effective western strategic systems which would be complementary, but autonomous, with one headquarters in Washington and the other on the European continent. I should like to emphasize that this concept would not give Germany national control over nuclear weapons. The aim must always be to transfer control over the use of weapons from national authority to community authority, to a central government. Only, such an authority must first exist, and it could only be embodied in the sovereign figure of the President of a European Federation. And for this stage to be reached, it will be necessary to accept solutions along the lines just set out.

It is difficult to understand why this idea should be attacked on the grounds that it involves the danger of creating a third nuclear power which—Independent from the United States and the Soviet Union—could trigger nuclear chaos. The fact that Britain and France are nuclear powers in Europe seems to be completely overlooked. Actually, creation of a European nuclear force would reduce the number of existing nuclear powers by one, and eliminate the risk of national panic accidentally precipitating a collision.

If this project of an American-European partnership is to be realized, which I consider essential to preserve our freedom, then all of us—you, ladies and gentlemen, your government and all Europeans have one great common objective, that is: to promote untritingly and unconditionally the politically integration of Western Europe so that a genuine American-European partnership may result to our mutual benefit. Only then will the presently precarious state of our security and of world peace give way to stable conditions.

VIETNAM

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah has the floor.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I realize we are technically in the morning hour and that my time has been extended two or three times by unanimous consent. I am happy to go on as long as the Senate agrees. I appreciate the comments of my colleagues, which have been pointed and

thoughtful. However, I do not want to trespass on the time of other Senators.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MOSS. I am happy to yield.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Did the Senator hear the figures on the total American casualties in the Vietnam war which the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), stated at Salt Lake City on Saturday evening?

Mr. MOSS. Yes.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. The casualty figure is over 290,000.

Mr. MOSS. Total casualties; that is correct.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Does the Senator know what the total casualties were in the war in Korea?

Mr. MOSS. I do know the number except I know they are less than the total in South Vietnam.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. At the present rate our casualties in the Vietnam war will in a few more weeks exceed the casualties of World War I.

Mr. MOSS. I think that is a correct figure, which gives some measure of the magnitude of the war we are carrying on.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I now yield to the Senator from Ohio.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I have read the Senator's statement and I have heard the remarks and comments of colleagues today. I hasten to agree with the general feeling.

We have discussed this matter quite frequently. There is nothing Congress can do to end this war. There is nothing Congress can do to bring these troops back. It is a matter for the Executive. I have had the feeling in the last 10 days, and the remarks of Secretary Rogers over the weekend would seem to indicate, that the administration is beginning to feel the urgency—I think approximately 8 months too late—of getting the troops out of Vietnam. They realize what the great majority of American people felt some months ago, that, when the decision was made to make this a political war and not a military war, it was all downhill for us. When we gave up the option of bombing the harbor, when we gave up our option of cutting off supplies, we violated all rules of warfare. Those of us who attended military academies have been taught—and it has been taught for centuries, I suppose—that the way to defeat an enemy is to isolate the battlefield and then destroy those troops there. We gave up this option several years ago. There was nowhere to go except this continuing guerrilla warfare which requires something like a 6-to-1 ratio. We have never been able to do it successfully. We know our troops individually have been victimized by the very

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nature of the Vietnamese. They have been exploited in everything. We know we must get out.

But I do feel, and it is one of the reasons I joined the Senator from Kansas (MR. DOLE), that the administration is beginning to feel this urgency and it is only through them that we can act. I have no desire to let up on the pressure because I cannot help but feel the pressure is what has put them in this frame of mind, which I believe is correct. I want to see this reflected in the time they ask for and I want to see these troops on the way home and as scheduled to assure an orderly withdrawal so that no GI's life is put in peril by these actions. The only place that schedule can come from is over in the Pentagon and from the White House. So, while we can point out what they should do, there is only one place it can be done. I think our pressure is well put.

I do not support the moratorium, as many Senators do.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

MR. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for an additional 2 minutes.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MR. SAXBE. Mr. President, I do not support the moratorium, as I said on the floor, because, as well intentioned as these young people are who put this matter together, and I have had letters from college presidents and others and I know how well intentioned Senators are, I question their ability to keep it out of the hands of the "crazies" who have moved into the area, not because of the war but because they are looking for a cause any place to cause disruption and revolution. I despair of their ability to handle the situation. It is for that reason I do not join.

Second, they ask for 2 days in November, and 3 days in December. If it does not work there is no problem, but if it does work, and nothing is going to happen to get all of our troops out of there if we start today, in 6 months we would have a week of trouble when we can least afford it next spring.

I commend the Senator from Utah. He, as I, looks forward to the day we can get down to the really important things in this country and leave behind the sad memory and the mistakes of Vietnam.

I thank the Senator.

MR. MOSS. I thank the Senator from Ohio for his comments about the conduct of the war. I, too, think there have been some mistakes in the conduct of the war but I think, as I said in my statement, that we have tried to pattern our experience largely on Korea where we also fought a limited war, and finally came to negotiate a cease-fire. We thought all along we could achieve the same thing in Vietnam but we were wrong. We have not been successful, however, because of bad military tactics, but because of the political realities of South Vietnam.

I agree the orders, whatever they are, are going to have to come from the Executive and military to move things. But I do not think we are not without great

influence in Congress. We can express a point of view. In the final analysis, we have to fund the war so they must come back to this reservoir of power if they want to continue this war.

Mr. President, this represents my point of view. I have tried to state it carefully and in a restrained manner. I appreciate the motivation of all Members of this body, who I am sure are struggling to find what they consider to be the proper solution to concluding the bloody conflict that goes on in Vietnam.

MR. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. MOSS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

MR. GORE. Mr. President, I have listened with interest to the very learned remarks of the distinguished Senator from Utah. I congratulate him upon his contribution and upon the contribution of other Senators which he has drawn forth.

Perhaps the Senator will recall that the senior Senator from Tennessee was the first person in this Chamber to express the conviction that the policy of phased withdrawal was not a path to peace but rather a program that would prolong the war. I reached this conclusion, in essence, because the policy of gradual withdrawal, incremental or phased, over a period of time, was tied to the survival of the Thieu-Ky regime in Saigon.

I felt and still feel that the best avenue to peace is the utilization of the overwhelming presence of the United States in South Vietnam to persuade a coalescence of the forces, factions, factors, and personalities in Vietnam. Unless the people who live there, whose country it is, are willing to live together in peace, there is no way that a country even as powerful as the United States can enforce a peace.

MR. MOSS. I thank the Senator from Tennessee and all my colleagues who have made these observations. I agree with the Senator from Tennessee that ultimately the decision of what happens there must come back to the people of South Vietnam themselves.

As I said in my original statement, the longer we stay there with military forces and prop up a government that does not command the allegiance of the people, the fighting will continue and no peace can come.

Perhaps when we withdraw, the present government will collapse, if it has not broadened its base. Then that government must give way to some other government; but, eventually, there has to be a government in Vietnam that will command the allegiance and respect of the great majority of the Vietnamese people. When that is done, then peace will be restored.

I think that our worrying about the composition of that government has now become quite irrelevant. It is just the fact that there must be a government which will command the allegiance of its people. But it is not for us to decide what that government will be. That is for the Vietnamese to decide.

MR. GORE. I suggest to the able Senator that the credibility of our whole

democratic system is being put to a severe test.

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson was elected President of the United States on a commitment to the American people, a promise, that American boys would not be sent into a land war in Asia to do what Asian boys should do for themselves.

Shortly after his election, I learned that plans were underway to send combat forces to Vietnam. I went to the White House, in an effort to dissuade President Johnson from committing ground troops to a land war in Asia. He reviewed the war with me. To make it brief, he said that President Eisenhower had sent advisers, that President Kennedy had sent more advisers, technicians, and aides, but that this was not enough and that he, President Johnson, must either withdraw the advisers, technicians, and aides, or send in combat troops.

He then made a very pointed remark to me, which I quote:

I am not going to be the first President to run.

I did not think that should be the question. I thought the question was the adoption of a wise policy for the United States under all these circumstances.

To make a brief analogy, Mr. Richard M. Nixon was elected President of the United States on a promise, specific and stated, a commitment to the American people to end the Vietnam war.

Six months after his election, there were more men in Vietnam than on the day of his inauguration. In the 9 months since his inauguration, we have had more than 68,000 American casualties in Vietnam.

Now President Nixon is quoted as having said—although he did not say this to me, as President Johnson did—but he is quoted widely as saying:

I am not going to be the first American President to preside over a defeat.

That should not now be the question, either. But after these two commitments to the American people, President Nixon is now pursuing the same policy, and making the same defense for policies and failures, as did former President Johnson.

What are the American people to do?

I do not like to set legislative deadlines. Frankly, I think this is a meat-ax approach. But, if the representatives of the people have no choice other than between a meat-ax approach and the continued meat grinding of our sons, it will be a hard choice, and the outcome may be unpredictable.

Yes, Mr. President, the credibility of our society, of the democratic process, of popular government is now being put to a severe test.

We are proud to say that the people are masters of their destiny, but when they make a decision upon the basis of commitments from people seeking highest office, and when those commitments are violated, it raises doubts. It creates hopelessness and frustration. This lends itself to extreme action.

I say to the Senator that debate in the Senate may be strident, but strident de-

bate is not so costly as the lives and bodies of 68,000 American boys.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Utah yield?

Mr. MOSS. I yield.

Mr. DOLE. Let me say, in response to the Senator from Tennessee, that I have often heard recitals on this floor about how we became involved in South Vietnam. I believe the Senator from Tennessee voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and in fact, all Senators did except two. That indicated, to me, at that time, that there was some support from the Senator from Tennessee for U.S. policy in Vietnam.

In debate, at least by inference, it has been indicated that President Nixon has not changed policy. The repeated statement has been made that there were more troops in Vietnam in February or March than when President Nixon came into office in January. As has been pointed out in this Chamber, those troop movements were programmed, as the Senator knows, last year. The point is that every Senator in this Chamber wants the war to end. There is a difference of opinion on how it should be ended. I happen to believe that President Nixon is on the correct course for peace, and that he does have a strategy for peace. He did not say he was going to end the war on January 21, 1 day after having been sworn in on January 20. Further, I would remind the Senator from Tennessee that Mr. Nixon is the first President since we became engaged in war in Vietnam to bring our boys back alive, to reduce the number of troops, and to deescalate the fighting.

I would guess that President Nixon has access to almost every fact there is to know about Vietnam. I would also say, as President Truman said so well: that President Nixon knows, "the buck stops here."

It is easy for me or other Senators to go around making judgments and criticizing, because we do not make the hard decisions. I know that everyone regrets and deplores the loss of one single life in South Vietnam.

We also deplore the injuries suffered by many of our boys. One can go to Walter Reed Hospital and find young men of 18, 19, and 20 years of age with arms gone, legs gone, and a variety of injuries. General MacArthur said we should never become involved in a land war in Asia. The Senator pointed out what President Johnson did. President Kennedy sent the first combat forces there. President Johnson sent troops there. President Nixon came into office in 1969, and he has had 8 short months to end the Vietnam war.

I ask the Senator from Tennessee, if he were the Hanoi government, and every day on the Senate floor Senators were saying, "We are not going to do anything but bring the boys home," how would he react?

I would guess the Senator from Tennessee supported negotiations. Many critics were for negotiations 8 or 10 months ago. Now some critics are saying, "Negotiations are not working; we must do something about it. We must withdraw on a unilateral basis." If we look at the war we can see there has been a

change in the direction of our policy toward the war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Utah may continue for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MOSS. I yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, it is not a question now of the Tonkin resolution. It is not a question of who erred and how tragically. The real question now is a policy for peace. Like other Senators, I wish peace, I wish to aid President Nixon in achieving peace; and I suggest that his policies are contradictory and self-defeating, and I hope that by calling attention to that fact, the policies will be altered.

The President says, on the one hand, that he is for self-determination by the people of South Vietnam, and he adds that this is not negotiable. But then, secondly, he says that he stands firmly behind and beside Mr. Thieu, who in turn says that he must run such elections as are held. Indeed, he says, no elections can be held until 2 years beyond some as yet unspecified date. He says, moreover, that there will be no coalition government, "not even for a reconciliatory government."

So, on the one hand, President Nixon's policy proclaims self-determination by the people of South Vietnam, but, on the other hand, he says, in effect, You must keep Mr. Thieu.

Mr. President, we must have a policy for peace, and that policy can be found within the framework of the Geneva accords, to which we once adhered, but to which neither we nor the other side has remained loyal.

This is in no sense, in my view, an expression of partisanship.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. In just a moment. I said the same thing when President Johnson was our Chief Executive.

The thrust of the sentiment in this country is for a settlement of the war; and to tie the United States to the survival of the Thieu regime and to equate peace for America—

Mr. DOLE. That is the statement of the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. With the political success of President Thieu is not a program for peace but one to prolong the war.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I do not have the floor.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I am glad to yield to the Senator from Kansas. Then I would like to wind this up.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I generally share the sentiments of the Senator from Tennessee, but do not believe he is stating President Nixon's position when he equates peace with support of the present Thieu regime.

On May 14, President Nixon set forth eight specific proposals for peace, they were not tied to any regime.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOLE. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I took the floor and praised that speech, but then President Nixon went to Midway and tied us to Mr. Thieu.

Mr. DOLE. I do not know about that, but am sorry I missed a speech in which the Senator praised President Nixon. We have had the other side of this issue presented almost daily and, starting today, we will have the other side presented. This is not a Republican or Democratic proposition, it is not a partisan issue. I just happen to believe that there has been a one-sided presentation on the Senate floor and by the American media. One would believe there is panic in the U.S. Senate and America and that we will do anything to get out of Vietnam. This is not an accurate impression and the people of the United States should be properly informed.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, in my statement I think I tried to make it perfectly clear that this was not a partisan issue. It rose above partisanship. The Senator from Kansas seems to think it is, in some way, and that he is called upon to defend the President's point of view.

I praised President Nixon for the withdrawal of such forces as came out of Vietnam. My only statement was that I felt it had been temporized too much and that it was qualified. I want him to state categorically and immediately that all offensive action will cease.

I am not saying that in criticism of any political party or any political leadership. I am just trying to state the position I think the United States should take. I am doing it on the floor of the Senate, in the presence of my colleagues, because I think the President must eventually listen to the Senate as he must listen to the people when they demonstrate peacefully.

I do not want us to degenerate into a partisan wrangle. I want us to stop the killing in Vietnam.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator may have 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I want to join the other Members of this body who commended the Senator from Utah this afternoon. I think he has presented, in a very concise and reasoned and thoughtful way, a sound and useful proposal. I am certainly hopeful that it will receive consideration by those who are developing our policy and recommendations. I think the Senator has obviously given the matter careful thought and consideration. He has made a useful contribution to the whole dialog on a difficult and complex problem, as has been brought out there this afternoon. It is a many-faceted problem. I think the Senator has shown an incisiveness and a reasoned thoughtfulness which will help many of us in this body.

I join the other Senators in commanding him for his statement.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MOSS. I yield.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. The question for consideration raised by the Senator from Tennessee is why, in view of the overwhelming sentiment of the American people we have not been able to disengage in Vietnam. We wonder why we had three candidates for the Presidency in the 1968 election, all of whom were war candidates. The problem is that we do not have a democratic system of nominating a President. Unfortunately, our political conventions are controlled by cliques. What we need is greater democracy in nominating the President. We need national preferential presidential primaries. I feel that if we had had national preferential presidential primaries, some candidate would have come forward and said, "I will settle the war." President Eisenhower did in 1952, and he won overwhelmingly on that platform. Had we had any candidate last year who unequivocally had promised to end the war, he would have won by a landslide.

I have felt this sentiment over the country, and I am hopeful that the reforms that the Democratic Party has proposed, and reforms which have been talked of in the Republican Party as well, will take place. I hope that both parties will reform their nominating procedures before 1972, to provide a greater voice for the people of this country in the nomination of candidates for the Presidency.

I thank the Senator for his great contribution today.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

SWEDEN: OUR GOVERNMENT GUILTY OF AFFRONT TOWARD A GREAT AND STABLE EUROPEAN NATION

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, Olof Palme, recently chosen as Prime Minister of Sweden, is the most outspoken critic of the heads of government of any European nation against our policies in Vietnam. He has denounced the United States as an aggressor in Vietnam.

Palme is leader of the Social Democratic Party. He received a bachelor's degree at Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio. He studied law in Sweden. He is still a young man, and his rise to power in 10 years has been spectacular.

Recently, he stated:

I am not anti-American but I denounce United States aggression in Vietnam. I sorrow that a country such as the United States where I attended college and where I have many affectionate friends has been an aggressor in a civil war in south Vietnam on the side of a minority opposed to national liberation.

Formerly, as Minister of Education he participated in Stockholm in an anti-American demonstration walking side by side with the Ambassador from North Vietnam. Recently he directed a grant of \$40 million as foreign aid from Sweden to North Vietnam.

Prime Minister Palme has also been outspoken in his denunciation of the fascist colonels who crushed democracy in Greece, and he has assailed his powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union, for its aggression against Czechoslovakia. This

wise young national leader recently reiterated Sweden's support for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

To date, President Nixon has refused to nominate an ambassador to Sweden. That post has been vacant since the departure of Ambassador William W. Heath on January 23, 1969, 3 days after President Nixon took office.

What valid reason can there be for this administration's continuing affront to the Swedish people in refusing to normalize diplomatic relations between the United States and Sweden? How can Nixon administration officials or our Secretary of State justify this policy when they continue diplomatic, economic, and even military support of fascist dictatorships in Greece, Spain, Haiti, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, to name a few of the nations ruled by fascist tyrants?

Can it be claimed that Sweden is engaged in hostile action against the United States? Has she aligned herself with our so-called foes? Of course not. The fact is that Sweden historically has been neutral. Sweden has not been involved in a military conflict since 1814. As stated, Prime Minister Palme has publicly denounced leaders of the Soviet Union for their aggression in Czechoslovakia. Sweden is neither a member of NATO nor the Warsaw Pact nations.

As for Sweden's policy of nonalignment, is her friendship toward the United States less valuable and less sought after than that of such nonaligned nations, so-called, as Switzerland, Finland, Burma, Indonesia, and Tanzania, to name a few neutral nations with whom we maintain cordial diplomatic relations?

Is Sweden's democratic form of government repugnant to our sensibilities? Manifestly not. The fact is Sweden is one of the world's freest societies, a nation with a long tradition and history of freedom and democracy.

Does the President delay naming an ambassador to Sweden because the Swedish Government disagrees with our involvement in a civil war in South Vietnam? The fact is that the United States maintains excellent diplomatic relations with a number of nations whose chiefs of state are extremely critical of our fighting an immoral, undeclared war in Vietnam—a war that has caused the death or maiming by our bombing and artillery fire of at least 500,000 Asian civilians—women, children, and old men. Among these nations are India, Pakistan, and France, not to mention the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations giving active diplomatic, economic, and military support to the National Liberation Front, the VC, and to North Vietnam.

Does the President refrain from appointing an ambassador to Sweden because Sweden has offered asylum to American servicemen, many of whom in good consciences believe that they cannot participate and kill in what they consider an immoral war? Evidently not, because the United States maintains extremely friendly relations with Canada, our neighbor to the north, which has also opened its doors and provides safe refuge

and, in fact, hospitality and friendship to hundreds of young Americans who are evading the draft for conscientious reasons and refuse to serve in what millions of Americans regard as our involvement in an undeclared, unpopular, and immoral war.

The Prime Minister of Sweden recently stated:

We shall continue to repeat simple but important truths. That the longing of peoples for freedom cannot be beaten by violence. . . . That peoples have the right to decide over their own destiny.

These are truths which were, in fact, embodied in 1776 in our Declaration of Independence.

Mr. President, Sweden is increasingly taking on a greater role in foreign affairs. Sweden is a dynamic young country with one of the world's highest standards of living. The per capita income in Sweden is surpassed only by one Nation—the United States. President Nixon's failure to name an ambassador to Sweden constitutes a continuing unwarranted and unconscionable insult to the Swedish people. In the long run, it will prove harmful to our Nation.

Olof Palme will officially become Prime Minister of Sweden tomorrow. President Nixon could make no finer expression of the traditional friendship between the United States and Sweden than by announcing his intention to name an American ambassador to Sweden without further delay.

ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH CUTS THREATEN NATION'S HEALTH

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, our Nation is facing a crisis in the field of health care. Every day we fall further behind in the race to provide adequate care for those who are ill and injured in our society. Earlier this year President Nixon correctly assessed the situation when he warned:

The Nation is faced with a breakdown in the delivery of health care unless immediate concerted action is taken by government and the private sector.

But rather than stepping up health programs, the administration has wielded a cruel ax and severely cut the existing programs, intensifying the imminent disaster and callously disregarding the lives and hopes of those Americans suffering from diseases.

In the October 13, 1969, issue of the Washington Post, reporter Victor Cohn, in his front-page article entitled "U.S. Scientists Fear Further Cuts in Aid," brilliantly illuminates the disaster which threatens our Nation. Drastic reductions in Government research grants will seriously deplete our future supply of Ph. D.'s. and M.D.'s. At a time when we desperately need to increase the number of doctors, researchers, and teachers, the administration has effectively undermined our medical schools and laboratories. As Mr. Cohn points out, health and science budgets are 40 percent less than in fiscal year 1967 and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare forecasts no research increases until 1973, to take up the losses in the past 3 or 4 years.